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Abstract
One objective of distributed artiﬁcial intelligence research is to build systems that are
capableof cooperative problemsolving. To this end, a number ofimplementation-oriented
models ofcooperative problemsolving have been developed. However, mathematical mod-
els of social activity have focussedonly on limited aspects of the cooperative problem solv-
ing process: no mathematical model of the entire process has yet been described. In this
paper, we rectify this omission. We present a preliminary model that describes the cooper-
ative problem solving process from recognition of the potential for cooperation through to
team action. The model is formalised by representing it as a theory in a quantiﬁed multi-
modal logic. A key feature of the model is its reliance on the twin notions of commitments
and conventions; conventions (protocols for monitoring commitments) are formalised for
the ﬁrst time in this paper. We comment on the generality of the model, outline its deﬁ-
ciencies, and suggest some possible reﬁnements and other future areas of research.
1 Introduction
Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence (DAI) is concerned with all forms of social activity in sys-
tems composed of multiple computational agents [1]. An important form of interaction in
such systems is cooperative problem solving (CPS), which occurs when a group of logically de-
centralised agents choose to work together to achieve a common goal. Relevant examples
include a group of agents moving a heavy object, playing a symphony, building a house, and
writing a joint paper. As these examples indicate, CPS is a common and important process in
human societies, and there is increasing evidence to support the claim that it will be similarly
important in future computer systems. A number of models of the CPS process have been
devised by DAI researchers. Some of these models represent frameworks for implementing
CPS systems, and for managing cooperativeactivitiesin such systems at run-time (e.g., [15, 5]).
Other, more formal models have been developed in an attempt to characterise various aspects
of CPS (e.g., [10, 8, 17]).
As isthe casein mainstream AI, the differing motivationsand approaches offormalists and
system builders has meant that there has been little cross-fertilisation between the two areas.
The former camp has concentrated on isolated aspects of the CPS process, whereas work in
the latter camp has concentrated on devising protocols for the entire CPS process. However,
the key assumptions and design decisions of implementation-oriented CPS models tend to
be buried deep inside the associated software; this can make it difﬁcult to extract general
principles or results from implementations.This paper goes some way to bridging the gap between theory and practice in DAI. We
develop a four-stage model of CPS, which we make precise by expressing it as a theory in
aq u a n t i ﬁed multi-modal logic. The development of this model was driven by an analysis
of CPS in both natural and artiﬁcial systems; the result is a theory that is accessible to both
formalists and system builders. For formalists, the model represents a ﬁrst attempt to capture
the properties of CPS in a mathematical framework, with the corollary that properties of the
model may be established via formal proof. For system builders, the model can serve as
an abstract, top-level speciﬁcation of a CPS system, which can inform the development of
future DAI applications. The model deals with a number of issues that have hitherto been
neglected by DAI theorists; for example, it considers the process by which an agent recognises
the potential for cooperation, and begins to solicit assistance. Note that although we have
attempted to develop a model that deals with CPS from beginning to end, we do not claim
that our model is the ﬁnal word on the subject; it would not be possible to present, in such
a short paper, a theory that dealt with all conceivable aspects of a process as complex as CPS
(see §5).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following section presents an
overview of the formal framework used to represent the model. In §3, the notions of commit-
ments and conventions, which play a key role in our model, are discussed and subsequently
formalised; the model of CPS is then developed in §4. Some conclusions are presented in §5.
2 A Formal Framework
This section gives an overview of the formal framework in which the model of CPS will be
expressed. This framework is a quantiﬁed multi-modal logic, which both draws upon and ex-
tends the work described in [3, 13]. Unfortunately, space restrictions prevent us from deﬁning
the language in full here; a complete formal deﬁnition of the language’s syntax and semantics
may be found in [17].
Informally, the operators of the language have the following meanings. The operator true
is a logical constant for truth. (Bel i ϕ) and (Goal i ϕ) mean that agent i has a belief, or goal of
ϕ respectively. The = operator is usual ﬁrst-order equality. The ∈ operator allows us to relate
agents to groups of agents; it has the expected set-theoretic interpretation, so (i ∈ g) means
that the agent denoted by i is a member of the group denoted by g.T h e (Agts α g) operator
means that the group denoted by g are precisely the agents required to perform the actions in
the action sequence denoted by α.T h eA operator is a path quantiﬁer: Aϕ means that ϕ is a path
formula that is satisﬁed in all the futures that could arise from the current state1. The operators
¬ (not) and ∨ (or) have classical semantics, as does the universal quantiﬁer ∀; the remaining
classical connectives and existential quantiﬁer are assumed to be introduced as abbreviations,
in the obvious way. (Happens α) is a path formula that means that the action α happens next;
α;α′ means the action α is immediately followed by α′; α|α′ means either α or α′ happen
next; ϕ? is a test action, which occurs if ϕ is ‘true’ in the current state; α∗ means the action α
iterated.
Some derived operators. A number of derived operators will now be introduced. First, the
usual connectives oflinear temporallogic: ϕ
U ψ meansϕ issatisﬁeduntil ψ becomessatisﬁed;
￿ϕ means ϕ is eventually satisﬁed; ϕ means ϕ is always satisﬁed. These connectives are
used to build path formulae. The path quantiﬁer E is the dual of A;t h u sEϕ means ϕ is a path
1There is a distinction madein the languagebetween pathand state formulae: state formulae are evaluatedwith
respect to the ‘current state’ of the world, whereas path formulae are evaluated with respect to a course of events.
The well-formed formulae of the language are identiﬁe dw i t ht h es e to fs t a t ef o r m u l a e[ 6 ] .formulae satisﬁed on at least one possible future.
ϕ
U ψ
def = (Happens (¬ψ?;ϕ?)∗;ψ?)
￿ϕ
def = true
U ϕ
ϕ
def = ¬
￿¬ϕ
Eϕ
def = ¬A¬ϕ
(Singleton gi ) means g is a singleton group with i as the only member. (Agt α i) means i is the
only agent of action α.
(Singleton gi )
def = ∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)⇒( j = i)
(Agt α i)
def = ∀g ⋅( Agts α g)⇒( Singleton gi )
To represent an action α achieving ag o a lϕ, we introduce a derived operator Achieves.
(Achieves αϕ )
def = A((Happens α)⇒( Happens α;ϕ?))
We will have a number of occasions to write A(Happens α),( a c t i o nα occurs next in all altern-
ative futures), and A¬(Happens α) (action α does not occur next in any alternative future), and
so we introduce abbreviations for these.
(Does α)
def = A(Happens α)( Doesn’t α)
def = A¬(Happens α)
We ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne knowledge as true belief, rather than by introducing it as yet
another primitive modality.
(Know i ϕ)
def = ϕ ∧( Bel i ϕ)
We also ﬁnd it convenient to use the notions of mutual mental states. Although we recog-
nise that such states are idealised, in that they are not realisable in systems which admit the
possibility of failed communication, they are nevertheless valuable abstraction tools for un-
derstanding multi-agent systems. The mutual belief of ϕ in a group of agents g is written
(M-Bel g ϕ); the mutual goal of ϕ in g is written (M-Goal g ϕ), and the mutual knowledge of ϕ
is written (M-Know g ϕ).W ed e ﬁne mutual mental states as ﬁxed points.
(M-Bel g ϕ)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒( Bel i ϕ ∧( M-Bel g ϕ))
(M-Goal g ϕ)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒( M-Bel g (Goal i ϕ))
(M-Know g ϕ)
def = ϕ ∧( M-Bel g (M-Know g ϕ))
3 Commitments, Conventions, and Intentions
The key mental states that control agent behaviour are intentions and joint intentions — the
former deﬁne local asocial behaviour, the latter control social behaviour [2]. Intentions are
important as they provide both the stability and predictability (through the notion of com-
mitment) that is needed for social interactions, and the ﬂexibility and reactivity (through the
mechanisms by which commitments are monitored) that are required to deal with a chan-
ging environment. Previous attempts to formalise (joint) intentions have made no distinction
between a commitment and its underlying convention; we clearly distinguish the two con-
cepts: a commitment is a pledge or a promise; a convention is a means of monitoring a commit-
ment — it speciﬁes both the conditions under which a commitment might be abandoned, and
how an agent should behave, should such a circumstance arise [8].
Commitments have a number of important properties (see [8] and [3, pp217–219] for a
discussion), but the most important is that commitments persist: having adopted a commit-
ment, we do not expect an agent to drop it until, for some reason, it becomes redundant. Theconditions under which a commitment can become redundant are speciﬁed in the associated
convention — examples include the motivation for the goal no longer being present, the goal
being achieved, and the realisation that the goal will never be achieved [3].
Whena group ofagentsare engagedin acooperativeactivity, theyhavea jointcommitment
to the overall aim, as well as individual commitments to the speciﬁc tasks that they have been
assigned. This joint commitment is parameterised by a social convention, which identiﬁes the
conditions under which the joint commitment can be dropped, and also describes how the
agent should behave towards fellow team members. For example, if an agent drops its joint
commitment because it believesthat the goalwill never be attained,then it is part of the notion
of ‘cooperativeness’ inherent in joint action that it informs fellow team members of its change
of state. In this context, social conventions provide general guidelines, and a common frame
of reference in which agents can work. By adopting a convention, every agent knows what
is expected both of it, and of every other agent, as part of the collective working towards the
goal, and knows that every other agent has a similar set of expectations.
Formally, we deﬁne a convention as a set of rules, each rule consisting of a re-evaluation
condition ρ and a goal γ : if ever an agent believes ρ to be true, then it must adopt γ as a goal,
and keep this goal until the commitment becomes redundant.
Deﬁnition 1 A convention, c, is an indexed set of pairs: c =
f(ρk,γk)|k ∈
f1,…,l
g
g,w h e r eρk
is a re-evaluation condition, and γk is a goal, ∀k ∈
f1,…,l
g.
Joint commitments have a number of parameters. First, a joint commitment is held by a group
g of agents. Second, joint commitments are held with respect to some goal ϕ; this is the state
of affairs that the group is committed to bringing about. Third, joint commitments are held
relative to a motivation, which characterises the justiﬁcation for the commitment. They also
have a pre-condition, which describes what must initially be true of the world in order for the
commitment to be held. For example, in most types of joint commitment, we do not expect
participating agents to initially believe that the object of the commitment, ϕ, is true. Finally,
a joint commitment is parameterised by a convention c. Joint commitment is then informally
deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition: (Joint commitments) Ag r o u pg is jointly committed to goal ϕ with
respect to motivation ψ, pre-condition pre, and convention c iff: (i) pre-condition
pre is initially satisﬁed; and (ii) until the termination condition is satisﬁed, every
agent in g either (a) has a goal of ϕ; or (b) believes that the re-evaluation condition
of some rule in c is satisﬁed, and has the goal corresponding to that re-evaluation
condition; where the termination condition is that the goal part of some convention
rule is satisﬁed.
More formally:
Deﬁnition 2 If c =
f(ρk,γk)|k ∈
f1,…,l
g
g is a convention, then:
(J-Commit g ϕψpre c)
def = ∀i ⋅( i ∈ g)⇒pre∧ A((p ∨ q)
U r)
where
p
def = (Goal i ϕ) q
def =
Wk
l=1(Bel i ρl)∧A[(Goal i γl)
U r] r
def =
Wk
m=1γm.
This general model can be used to capture the properties of many different types of joint
commitment. For example, we will now specify a social convention that is similar to the
Levesque-Cohen model of joint persistent goals (JPGs) [10]. LetpreJPG
def = ¬(Bel i ϕ)∧( Bel i E
￿ϕ)
cJPG
def =
 
 
 
 
 
((Bel i ϕ),(M-Bel g ϕ)),
((Bel i A ¬ϕ),(M-Bel g A ¬ϕ)),
((Bel i ¬ψ),(M-Bel g ¬ψ))
 
 
 
 
 
.
A group with a joint commitment parameterised by a pre-condition preJPG, and convention cJPG
will have a shared mental state identical in all important respects to that implied by the JPGs
of Levesque-Cohen. We use joint commitments to deﬁne joint intentions, which are held by
ag r o u pg with respect to an action α and motivation ψ. In general, it is possible to make
conventions a parameter of joint intentions. However, this would complicate our subsequent
formalism, and we therefore leave this reﬁnement to future work. For the purposes of this
paper, we simply assume that joint intentions are deﬁned over the JPG-like convention cJPG;
this gives us a model of joint intentions similar to that in [10, p98].
(J-Intend g αψ )
def = (M-Bel g (Agts α g)) ∧
(J-Commit g A
￿(Happens (M-Bel g (Does α))?;α) ψ preJPG cJPG)
Thus a joint intention in g to do α means having a joint commitment that eventually g will
believe α will happen next, and then α happens next. An individual intention by agent i to
do α with motivation ψ is a special case of joint intention.
(Intend i αψ )
def = ∀g ⋅( Singleton gi )⇒( J-Intend g αψ )
4 The Cooperative Problem Solving Process
In this section, we present a four-stage model of CPS, which we formalise by expressing it in
the logic described in §2. The four stages of the model are:
1. Recognition: The CPS process begins when some agent recognises the potential for co-
operative action; this recognition may come about because an agent has a goal that it is
unable to achieve in isolation, or, more generally, because the agent prefers assistance.
2. Team formation: During this stage, the agent that recognised the potential for cooperat-
ive action at stage (1) solicits assistance. If this stage is successful, then it will end with
a group having a joint commitment to collective action.
3. Plan formation: During this stage, the agents attempt to negotiate a joint plan that they
believe will achieve the desired goal.
4. Team action: During this stage, the newly agreed plan of joint action is executed by the
agents, which maintain a close-knit relationship throughout; this relationship is deﬁned
by an agreed social convention, which every agent follows.
Although we believe that most instances of CPS exhibit these stages in some form, we
stress that the model is idealised. We recognise that there are cases which the model cannot
account for, and we highlight these wherever appropriate. Our aim has been to construct
a framework that describes CPS from beginning to end, but is abstract (in that details which
might obscure more signiﬁcant points have been omitted). (We once again stress that although
space restrictions mean thatwe cannot completely deﬁne the logic used torepresent the model
here, a complete deﬁnition is presented in [17].)4.1 Recognition
CPS begins when some agent in a multi-agent community has a goal, and recognises the po-
tential for cooperative action with respect to that goal. Recognition may occur for several
reasons:
• Theparadigm case is thatin which the agentis unable toachieveits goal in isolation, due
to a lack of resources, but believes that cooperative action can achieve it. For example, an
agent may have a goal that, to achieve, requires information only accessible to another
agent; without the cooperation of this other agent, the goal cannot be achieved.
• Alternatively, an agent may have the resources to achieve the goal, but does not want to
use them. There may be several reasons for this: it may believe that in working alone
on this particular problem, it will clobber one of its other goals, or it may believe that a
cooperative solution will in some way be better (e.g., derived faster, more accurate).
In order to more precisely deﬁne the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperative
action, it is necessary to introduce a number of subsidiary deﬁnitions. First, we require deﬁn-
itions of single- and multi-agent ability: what it means to be able to bring about some state
of the world. Several attempts to deﬁne multi-agent ability have appeared in the literature
(e.g., [14]). However, there is currently no consensus on the appropriateness of these deﬁni-
tions. For this reason, we adapt the well-known model of ability proposed by Moore [12].
Deﬁnition: (Single-agent ability) Agent i can achieve ϕ iff there is some possibly
complex action α of which i is the sole agent, such that either: (i) i knows that after
it performed α, ϕ would be satisﬁed; or (ii) i knows that after it performed α,i t
could achieve ϕ.
Clause (i) is the base case, where an agent knows the identity of an action that will achieve the
goal ϕ directly. Clause (ii) allows for the possibility of an agent performing an action in order
to ﬁnd out how to achieve ϕ.T h i sr e c u r s i v ed e ﬁnition is easily generalised to the multi-agent
case.
Deﬁnition: (Multi-agent ability) Group g can achieve ϕ iff there is some possibly
complex actionα and somegroup g′, such that it is mutually known in g thatg′⊆g,
and g′ are the agents of α, and it is mutually known in g that either (i) after α was
performed, ϕ would be satisﬁed; or (ii) after α was performed, g would have the
multi-agent ability to achieve ϕ.
Once again, clause (i) represents the base case, where the group is mutually aware of the iden-
tity of some action that could be performed by some subset of the group (whose identity must
also be known), such that performing the action would achieve the goal directly. Clause (ii) is
the recursive case, where the group is required to know the identity of some action and subset
of agents such that performing the action would bring them closer to the goal.
Am o r ep r e c i s ed e ﬁnition of potential for cooperation can now be given.
Deﬁnition: (Potential for cooperation) With respect to agent i’s goal ϕ,t h e r ei s
potential for cooperation iff: (i) there is some group g such that i believes that g
can jointly achieve ϕ; and either (ii) i can’t achieve ϕ in isolation; or (iii) i believes
that for every action α that it could perform which achieves ϕ, it has a goal of not
performing α.Note that in clause (i), an agent needs to know the identity of a group that it believes
can cooperate to achieve its goal. This is an overstrong assumption. It precludes an agent
attempting to ﬁnd out the identity of a group that can achieve the goal, and it does not allow
an agent to simply broadcast its goal in the hope of attracting help (as in the CNET [15]).
However,catering for these caseswould complicate the formalisationa good deal,and obscure
some more important points. We therefore leave such reﬁnements to future work.
The ideas introduced above are readily expressed using the language we described in §2.
First, we write (Can i ϕ) iff i can achieve ϕ in isolation.
(Can i ϕ)
def = ∃α ⋅( Know i (Agt α i)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ∨
∃α ⋅( Know i (Agt α i)∧( Achieves α (Can i ϕ)))
Multi-agent ability is a generalisation of single-agent ability.
(J-Can g ϕ)
def = ∃α ⋅∃ g′⋅( M-Know g (g′⊆g)∧( Agts α g′) ∧ (Achieves αϕ )) ∨
∃α ⋅∃ g′⋅( M-Know g (g′⊆g)∧( Agts α g′) ∧ (Achieves α (J-Can g ϕ)))
We can now formally state the conditions that characterise the potential for cooperation.
(PfC i ϕ)
def = (Goal i ϕ)∧∃ g ⋅( Bel i (J-Can g ϕ)) ∧
 
¬(Can i ϕ)∨
(Bel i ∀α ⋅( Agt α i)∧( Achieves αϕ )⇒( Goal i (Doesn’t α)))
 
4.2 Team Formation
Having identiﬁed thepotential for cooperativeaction with respect to oneof its goals, arational
agent will solicit assistance from some group of agents that it believes can achieve the goal. If
the agent is successful, then at the conclusion of this team formation stage, the agent will have
brought about a mental state wherein the group has a joint commitment to collective action.
(There will not yet be a joint intention to act; this comes later.) An agent cannot guarantee that
it will be successful in forming a team; it can only attempt it. We adapt the model of attempts
developed by Cohen-Levesque [4, p240].
Deﬁnition: (Attempts) An attempt by agent i to bring about a state ϕ is an action
α performed by i with the goal that after α is performed, ϕ is satisﬁed, or at least
ψ is satisﬁed.
The ultimate goal of the attempt — the thing that i hopes to bring about — is represented by
ϕ,w h e r e a sψ represents ‘what it takes to make an honest effort’ [4, p240]. If i is successful,
then bringing about ψ will be sufﬁcient to cause ϕ.
The team formation stage can then be characterised as an assumption made about rational
agents: namely, that an agent which recognises the potential for cooperative action will solicit
assistance.
Assumption: (Team formation) An agent i, who believes that there is potential
for cooperative action with respect to its goal ϕ, will eventually attempt to bring
about in some group g, (that it believes can jointly achieve ϕ), a state wherein: (i) it
is mutually believed in g that g can jointly achieve ϕ,a n dg are jointly committed
to team action with respect to i’s goal ϕ; or, failing that, to at least cause in g (ii) the
mutual belief that i has a goal of ϕ and the mutual belief that i believes g can jointly
achieve ϕ.Part (i) represents the commitment that the group has towards i’s goal ϕ if i is successful
in its attempt to solicit assistance; we discuss what team action means in §4.4. Note that
an agent might have its own reasons for agreeing to participate in a cooperative action, that
are unconnected with the request by the agent that recognises the potential for cooperation.
However, we have not attempted to deal with such cases here.
The team formation assumption implicitly states that agents are veracious with respect to
their goals, i.e., that they will try to inﬂuence the group by revealing their true goal. We do not
consider cases where agents are mendacious (i.e., they lie about their goals), or when agents
do not reveal their goals. (We refer the interested reader to [7, pp159–165]for a discussion and
formalisation of these considerations.)
We write
fAttempt i αϕψ
g for an attempt by i to achieve ϕ by performing α,a tl e a s t
achieving ψ. Following Cohen-Levesque, we use curly brackets to indicate that attempts are
complex actions, not predicates [4, p240].
fAttempt i αϕψ
g
def =
 
 
 
(Bel i ¬ϕ)∧( Agt α i)∧
(Goal i (Achieves αϕ )) ∧
(Intend i (Does α;ψ?))
 
 
 ?;α
We introduce an abbreviation to simplify subsequent formalisation: (Pre-Team g ϕ i) means
that (i) g mutually believe that they can jointly achieve ϕ; and (ii) g are jointly committed to
becoming a team with respect to i’s goal ϕ.
(Pre-Team g ϕ i)
def = (M-Bel g (J-Can g ϕ)) ∧
(J-Commit g (Team g ϕ i)( Goal i ϕ) preJPG cJPG)
(Team is deﬁned in §4.4.) The main assumption concerning team formation can now be stated.
Assumption 1 |= ∀i ⋅( Bel i (PfC i ϕ)) ⇒ A
￿∃g ⋅∃ α ⋅( Happens
fAttempt i α pq
g) where
p
def = (Pre-Team g ϕ i)
q
def = (M-Bel g (Goal i ϕ)∧( Bel i (J-Can g ϕ))).
If team formation is successful then for the ﬁrst time there will be a social mental state relating
to i’s goal, which contrasts with i’s individual perspective that has guided the process until
this stage.
4.3 Plan Formation
If an agent is successful in its attempt to solicit assistance, then there will be a group of agents
with a joint commitment to collective action. But collective action cannot begin until the group
agree on what they will actually do. Hence the next stage in the CPS process: plan formation.
We saw above that a group will not form a collective unless they believe they can actually
achieve the desired goal. This, in turn, implies that there is at least one action that is known to
the group that will take them ‘closer’ to the goal (see the deﬁnition of J-Can, above). However,
it is possible that there are many agents that know of actions the group can perform in order
to take the collective closer to, or even achieve the goal. Moreover, some members of the
collective may have objections to one or more of these actions. For example, an agent may
believe that a particular action has hitherto unforeseen and damaging consequences. It is
therefore necessary for the collective to come to some agreement about exactly which course
of action they will follow. Negotiation is the mechanism via which such agreement is reached.Negotiation usually involves agents making reasoned arguments for and against courses
of action; making proposals and counter proposals; suggesting modiﬁcations or amendments
to plans; and continuing in this way until all the negotiators have reached agreement2.N e -
gotiation has long been recognised as a process of some importance for DAI (see, e.g., [16]).
Unfortunately, analyses of negotiation demonstrate that it is also extremely complex — a rig-
orous attempt at formalisation is quite beyond the scope of this paper3. Instead, we simply
offer some observations about the weakest conditions under which negotiation can be said to
have occurred.
What can we say about negotiating a plan? First, we note that negotiation may fail:t h e
collective may simply be unable to reach agreement, due to some irreconcilable differences. In
this case, the minimum condition required for us to be able to say that negotiation occurred
at all is that at least one agent proposed a course of action that it believed would take the
collective closer to the goal. However, negotiation may also succeed. In this case, we expect
a team action stage to follow — we shall say no more about team action here, as this is the
subject of the next section.
We can make a number of other tentative assumptions about the behaviour of agents dur-
ing negotiation. Most importantly, we might assume that they will attempt to bring about their
preferences. For example, if an agent has an objection to some plan, then it will attempt to
prevent this plan being carried out. Similarly, if it has a preference for some plan, then it will
attempt to bring this plan about.
We shall now make the above discussion more precise. First, we deﬁne joint attempts:w h a t
it means for a group of agents to collectively attempt something. As might be expected, joint
attempts are a generalisation of single-agent attempts.
Deﬁnition: (Joint attempts) An attempt by a group of agents g to bring about a
state ϕ is an action α,o fw h i c hg are the agents, performed with the mutual goal
thatafterα is performed, ϕ is satisﬁed, or atleastψ is satisﬁed (where ψ represents
what it takes to make a reasonable effort).
Next, we state the minimum conditions required for negotiation to have occurred.
Assumption: (Negotiation) If group g are a pre-team with respect to agent i’s goal
ϕ,t h e ng will eventually jointly attempt to bring about a state where it is mutually
known in g that g are a team with respect to i’s goal ϕ, or, failing that, to at least
bring about a state where some agent j ∈ g has made g mutually aware of its belief
that some action α can be performed by g in order to achieve ϕ.
In other words, the group will try to bring about a state where they have agreed on a
common plan, and intend to act on it. Failing that, they will bring about a state where at least
one of them has proposed a plan that it believed would achieve the desired goal. The other,
more tentative assumptions about agent behaviour during negotiation are as follows.
Assumption: (Making preferencesknown) If group g are a pre-team with respect
to agent i’s goal ϕ,a n dt h e r ei ss o m ea c t i o nα such that it is mutually believed in
g that α achieves ϕ,a n dt h a tg are the agents of α,t h e ne v e r ya g e n tj ∈ g that has
a preference that α does/does not occur will attempt to ensure that α does/does
not occur, by at least making g mutually aware of its preference for/against α.
We are once again assuming that agents are veracious, in that they attempt to inﬂuence the
team by revealing their true preferences, rather than by lying, or concealing their true prefer-
ences.
2It may also involve agents lying, or being cunningand devious, though we shall not consider such cases here.
3But see [9] for preliminary work on logical models of argumentation.We begin by formalising joint attempts.
fJ-Attempt g αϕψ
g
def =
 
 
 
(M-Bel g ¬ϕ)∧( Agts α g)∧
(M-Goal g (Achieves αϕ )) ∧
(J-Intend g (Does α;ψ?))
 
 
 ?;α
The main assumption characterising negotiation can now be given. (Team is deﬁned below.)
Assumption 2 |= (Pre-Team g ϕ i)⇒A
￿∃α ⋅( Happens
fJ-Attempt g α pq
g) where
p
def = (M-Know g (Team g ϕ i))
q
def = ∃j ⋅∃ α ⋅( j ∈ g)∧( M-Bel g (Bel j (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ ))).
To formalise the assumption that members make their preferences known, we need to capture
the notion of an agent trying to cause and trying to prevent a group performing an action.
(Try-to-cause igα)
def = ∃α′⋅A(Happens
fAttempt i α′( Does α)( M-Bel g (Goal i (Does α)))
g)
The deﬁnition of (Try-to-prevent igα) is similar to Try-to-cause, and is therefore omitted.
Assumption 3 Agents who have a preference for some action make the team mutually aware
of their preference:
|= ∀g ⋅∀ i ⋅∀ α ⋅( Pre-Team g ϕ i)∧( M-Bel g (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ⇒
[∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)∧( Goal j (Does α)) ⇒ (Try-to-cause jgα)].
Agents who prefer some action not to be performed make the team mutually aware of their
preference:
|= ∀g ⋅∀ i ⋅∀ α ⋅( Pre-Team g ϕ i)∧( M-Bel g (Agts α g)∧( Achieves αϕ )) ⇒
[∀j ⋅( j ∈ g)⇒( Goal j (Doesn’t α)) ⇒ (Try-to-prevent jgα)].
If plan formation is successful then the team will have a joint commitment to the goal, and
will have agreed to the means by which they will pursue this goal. Ideally, we would like to
specify that the group also negotiate a convention for monitoring team action. Unfortunately,
we have no direct way of representing such behaviour: it would require quantiﬁcation over
formulae of the language, and such a meta-level notion cannot be represented at the object
level in a normal modal language such as that used here (see §5).
4.4 Team Action
If a collective is successful in its attempt to negotiate a plan, then we expect that collective to
follow up negotiation with action. This gives us the fourth, and ﬁnal stage in our model: team
action. For this stage, we simply require that the team jointly intend some appropriate action.
Deﬁnition: (Team action) Ag r o u pg are considered a team with respect to i’s goal
ϕ iff there is some action α,s u c ht h a t :( i )α achieves ϕ; and (ii) g have a joint
intention of α,r e l a t i v et oi having a goal of ϕ.
The formalisation of Team is simple.
(Team g ϕ i)
def = ∃α ⋅( Achieves αϕ )∧( J-Intend g α (Goal i ϕ))
From the deﬁnition of J-Intend, we know that the group will remain committed to mutually
believing they are about to perform the action, and then performing it. Moreover, if ever
one of them comes to believe, for example, that i no longer has a goal of ϕ, then the social
convention dictates that the agent will make the team aware of this, and team action will end.5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented an abstract formal model of cooperative problem solving,
which describes all aspects of the process, from recognition of the potential for cooperation
through to team action. This model considers a number of issues that have hitherto been neg-
lected by DAI theorists. For example, it deﬁnes the conditions under which there is potential
forcooperativeaction, andshows how an agent’sindividual mental statecan leaditto attempt
to build a social mental state in a group. The model has a number of other properties, which
we shall brieﬂy discuss in this section.
Although we have not explicitly considered communication, our model is nevertheless
consistent with one of the best current theories of speech acts: in [4], Cohen-Levesque pro-
posed a theory in which illocutionary acts are treated as attempts to bring about some mental
state in a conversation participant. At a number of points, our model predicts precisely such
attempts; for example, the model predicts that an agent which recognises the potential for co-
operation will attempt to bring about a joint commitment to collective action in some group
that it believes can achieve its goal.
Another interesting property is that the model consists of a set of liveness properties [11].
This is consistent with the view of agents as intelligentreactive systems,r e s p o n d i n gi nareasoned
way to their goals, and events that occur in their environment.
The model also predicts that agents will attempt to initiate social interaction if they have
goals that are dependent on other community members. In order to do this, the agents must
have some knowledge about the abilities, skills, and interests of their acquaintances.
Finally, the modelpredictsthat once a group ofagentsare formedinto a collective, theywill
attempt to negotiate a plan that they believe will achieve the desired objective. Moreover, they
will make their preferences known with respect to such plans, and are not required simply to
accept another agent’s proposals; they are thus autonomous, rather than benevolent.
There are a number of issues that we intend to address in future work, the most obvious of
which is the need for reﬁnement of the model, as highlighted in the main text. Additionally,
there are a number of ways in which the language we have used for representing the model
needs to be extended. The two most signiﬁcant points are the need to quantify over complex
action expressions, and the need to be able to represent meta-level notions at the object level.
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